Louisiana Law Review
Volume 26 | Number 3
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1965-1966 Term: A Faculty Symposium
Symposium: Administration of Criminal Justice
April 1966

Public Law: Discharge in Bankruptcy
Hector Currie

Repository Citation
Hector Currie, Public Law: Discharge in Bankruptcy, 26 La. L. Rev. (1966)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol26/iss3/16

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

19661

PUBLIC LAW

It is well settled that the "equal protection" clause of the
United States Constitution only relates to equality between persons. "In the absence of restrictions contained in state constitutions, the legislature may determine within broad limits
whether particular laws shall extend to the whole state or be
limited in their operation to particular portions of the state. All
that the Federal Constitution requires is that they shall be
general in their application within the territory in which they
operate."' 19 A relevant limitation in the Louisiana Constitution
prohibits local or special laws "concerning any civil or criminal
actions. '20 This provision has been construed as meaning "merely
that the Legislature shall not pass a local or special law affecting
any particular lawsuit or regulating the trial of lawsuits, civil
or criminal, in any particular locality."'21
Turning more specifically to the problem at hand, Justice
Sanders added: "The rich diversities in the land, people, and
culture of Louisiana are matters of common knowledge. They
have been celebrated in song and story. Many of these are deeply
rooted in history. The rural-urban diversity is but one of several that affect trespass laws. The variegated patterns of
topography and land-use militate against state-wide uniformity
in trespass legislation. '22 In further support of the decision,
upholding the statute, the court stressed the fact that there had
been "no showing that the relevant conditions and needs in Jefferson Davis Parish are the same as those of other parishes,"
and stated, "The Court cannot assume the absence of differences
when there is no proof."

DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY
Hector Currie*
The past term produced, as usual, instances of lenders who
asserted that their claims were not affected by a debtor's discharge in bankruptcy, by reason of section 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act which provides in part:
19. 16 Am. JUR.2d 894.
20. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
21. State v. McCue, 141 La. 417, 421, 75 So. 100, 101

22. 247 La. 631, 637, 173 So. 2d 192, 195 (1965).
23. Ibid.
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"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from
all of his provable debts ....
except such as . .. (2) are liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses
or false representations, or for obtaining money or property
on credit, or obtaining the extension or renewal of credit in
reliance upon a materially false statement in writing respecting his financial condition made or published or caused
to be made or published in any manner whatsoever with intent to deceive ....
To bring his debt within this language, a plaintiff must
show: "(1) That defendant made false representations; (2) that
these representations were made with the intention of defrauding the plaintiff, and (3) that the plaintiff relied upon and was
' 2
misled by the false pretenses or representations.
In Max Barnett Furniture Co., Inc. v. Romano,8 defendant
bought goods on credit and gave plaintiff a financial statement
that disclosed total indebtedness of $1580; later defendant became bankrupt and scheduled liabilities amounting to almost
$15,000. Plaintiff, however, neglected to show when the scheduled liabilities were incurred, and thus failed in its burden of
proving that the financial statement was false.
Blue Bonnet Creamery, Inc. v. Gulf Milk Ass'n, Inc. 4 was a
garnishment proceeding where the debter pleaded a discharge
in bankruptcy and plaintiff claimed that the debtor had defrauded it by giving worthless checks. It was proved, however,
that plaintiff's manager, who was closely familiar with the
debtor's financial condition, had insisted that the checks be issued though warned by the debtor that some of them would
probably be dishonored. There was no intent to defraud, and
any possible presumption' of intent to defraud was rebutted
by the evidence.
In Friendly Fin. Discount Corp. v. Hayden,6 defendants applied for a loan with which to pay two existing debts to plain1. 11 U.S.C. §35a(2) (1964).
2. DeLatour v. Lala, 15 La. App. 276, 278, 131 So. 211, 212 (Orl. Cir.
1930).
3. 170 So. 2d 700 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
4. 172 So. 2d 133 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965). For a reference to the litigation at an earlier stage, see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1962-1963 Term - Discharge in Bankruptcy, 24 LA. L. REv. 278, 280 (1964).
5. See LA. R.S. 14:71 (1950).
6. 171 So. 2d 717 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
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tiff. The "application and financial statement" signed by defendants was filled in by plaintiff's agent and showed only the
two debts; spaces for salary and for other income were left
blank. The court held that this paper was not a "statement in
writing respecting.. . financial condition" within section 17a (2),
and that in any event reliance on it by plaintiff had not been
proved. In General Fin. Loan Co. v. Allen, 7 however, where a
financial statement signed by defendant and his wife omitted
certain debts and contained the statement in the wife's handwriting: "We have no other debts," the money-lender was allowed to recover.
Section 17a (2) also provides:
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from
all of his provable debts ....
except such as ... (2) are liabilities . . . for willful and malicious injuries to the person
or property of another .... "I'
In Heyerdale v. Haneman9 plaintiff had contracted with defendant for repairs to real estate that plaintiff owned, all material and labor to be furnished by defendant. Before the work
was completed, plaintiff paid the contract price, but defendant
failed to pay the subcontractors and materialmen, who threatened to file liens against the property. Plaintiff then paid nearly
$3,000 to the materialmen and subcontractors and got judgment
against defendant for this sum. The judgment was held not
to be affected by the subsequent bankruptcy of defendant whose
misapplication of funds was a misdemeanor' ° and came within
the class of "willful and malicious injuries to the person or
property of another."
Section 17a (3) provides:
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from
all of his provable debts ....
except such as . . . (3) have
not been duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance,
with the name of the creditor if known to the bankrupt, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy . . .,,
7. 165 So. 2d 20 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 35a(2) (1964).
9. 170 So. 2d 401 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
10. LA. R.S. 14:202 (1950).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 35a(3) (1964).
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Lashover v. Audler 12 raised the question whether plaintiff
had actual knowledge of the proceedings; his claim had not
been scheduled in defendant's bankruptcy and consequently no
notice' 8 had been received. Defendant testified that in an accidental meeting with plaintiff he "mentioned" that he had "filed
bankruptcy," but plaintiff denied that such a conversation had
taken place. The court considered that if the conversation took
place it imparted no more than knowledge of the bare fact of
bankruptcy. "'Actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy' in our opinion consists of more than the knowledge which
might result from a casual reference to a bankruptcy in an offhand manner during a conversation attendant upon a chance
meeting. It means knowledge of facts at least sufficient to apprise the creditor that a proceeding is actually commenced and
where that proceeding is pending. '14 These statements are consistent with a suggestion in Robinson v. Henderson'5 that actual
knowledge must be "generally equivalent to . . . legal notice,"
but they seem somewhat generous to the creditor.' 6
Marks v. Demarest17 and Huff v. Justice' held that a judicial
mortgage subsists on property owned by a bankrupt at the time
of his discharge but will not affect property he may later acquire; these cases however established nothing new.' 9
12.
13.
notice
14.
15.

171 So. 2d 834 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
"The 'notice' contemplated by the statute is the formal written or printed
sent to the creditor 'by the Bankruptcy Court." Id. at 835.
Id. at 836.
162 So. 2d 1.1.6
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).

16. The problem

is discussed,

I COLLIE,

BANKRUPTCY

§ 17.23

(14th

ed.

1904); 8 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 3357 (6th ed. 1955).
17. 174 So.2d 160 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
18. 174 So. 2d 164 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
19. See Comment, 34 TUL. L. 1Ev. 768, 776 (1960) ; Schexnailder v. Fontenot, 147 La. 467, 477, 85 So. 207, 211 (1920).

